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DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
Alcoa Inc. is the world’s largest producer of aluminum and alu-
mina and fabricated products. It is involved in all segments of the
industry: mining, refining, smelting, fabricating, and recycling. In
2000, following a 1999 merger with Reynolds, Alcoa had approxi-
mately 140,000 employees with 300 operating locations in 36 coun-
tries. In 2001, Alcoa had approximately 142,000 employees in 37
countries. Alcoa’s 2001 revenues were U.S.$22.9 billion (Alcoa 2001).
 Aluminum, an extremely abundant element, must be extracted
from other substances. Bauxite is the basic physical raw material from
which aluminum is obtained. Bauxite contains approximately 45 per-
cent alumina, which is a powdery aluminum oxide that looks like white
granulated sugar. After the alumina is removed from the bauxite, the
aluminum and the oxygen are separated in an electrolytic reduction cell
commonly called a “pot,” in which the alumina is dissolved in molten
cryolite and is reduced to metallic aluminum. The aluminum is then
cast into large ingots or smaller molds called “hogs” or “pigs,” which
are suitable for remelting or fabricating (Alcoa 2001). This is called the
aluminum smelting process. Plants that produce primary aluminum are
commonly called smelters.
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HISTORY OF THE FACILITY
Alcoa’s Rockdale facility is located in Rockdale, Texas, a town of
approximately 5,200. Rockdale is approximately 60 miles (100 kilo-
meters) northeast of Austin and 144 miles (230 kilometers) northwest
of Houston. The plant is a smelter, extracting aluminum from alumina,
and also produces aluminum powder. 
 The plant’s major customer is internal to Alcoa, an Alcoa flat-
rolled aluminum plant in Davenport, Iowa. Among the major final cus-
tomers for the aluminum produced at Rockdale are the aerospace
industry and lithographic industry, which uses aluminum in litho-
graphic plates. Aluminum powder is used in such products as deodor-
ant, paint, metal pots, ordnance, and rocket fuels.
The Rockdale smelter was completed in 1952 as part of the United
States’ defense effort to maintain a large supply of aluminum for
defense purposes. Electricity, the largest cost input to the aluminum
manufacturing process, is used to provide power to run the facility and
to extract the aluminum from the alumina. The smelter was located in
Rockdale because of the presence of a large supply of lignite coal to
provide electricity for the facility. There is a coal mine, called the San-
dow Mine, that is adjacent to the Rockdale facility, and that provides
coal to power the facility’s electrical generators. Although Alcoa has
always owned the mine and the power plant, until 1988–1989, Alcoa
contracted the operation of the mine and power plant to the utility that
served the Rockdale area. Alcoa has operated the mine since 1988, and
the power plant since 1989. 
It was believed that the Sandow Mine would provide a long-term
supply of electricity. This was to be especially advantageous because it
was believed in the early 1950s that the supply of electricity from
water would soon peak, and other sources would be necessary.
Although it is more costly to produce electricity from coal than from
water, Alcoa believed that this cost disadvantage would be more than
offset by adequate supplies of coal from the Sandow Mine.
Current employment (both salaried and hourly) at the site, includ-
ing the mine, power plant, and smelter, is approximately 1,300. The
peak employment at the site was approximately 2,000, reached in the
early 1970s. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, this decline in employment
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reflected the overall decline in employment in the primary aluminum
industry in the United States over the past quarter of a century. 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT ROCKDALE
Of the 1,300 employees at Rockdale, 800 are hourly employees
represented by United Steelworkers of America (USWA) Local 4895,
260 are power plant or mine employees represented by a local of
another international union, and 240 are salaried and unrepresented.
The focus of this case study is on the relationship between Local 4895
and Alcoa, although the relationship between Alcoa and the other local
will be addressed as necessary.
Local 4895 was certified as the collective bargaining representa-
tive of the production and maintenance employees at Rockdale in
1953. In 2000, the employees represented by Local 4895 were covered
Figure 5.1 Employment in Primary Aluminum Industry, All Employees 



























by a master agreement between Alcoa and the international union,
United Steelworkers of America covering plants in Badin, North Caro-
lina; Alcoa (Knoxville), Tennessee; Bauxite, Arkansas; and Pt. Com-
fort, Texas, in addition to the Rockdale employees. The parties have
generally had a harmonious relationship. The only exception was a 35-
day strike in 1986, from June 1 to July 4, that was called among all
employees represented under the Alcoa–USWA master agreement.
As a result of that strike, Alcoa obtained additional flexibility in
combining classifications and, therefore, restructuring the way work
was performed. Prior to 1986, more classification lines were in exist-
ence, and Alcoa could only assign employees outside their respective
classifications on a voluntary basis. Following the work stoppage,
employees were required to perform any assignment they were quali-
fied to safely perform.
Overall, the relationship between Alcoa and Local 4895 is mature
and cooperative. The parties arbitrate only one or two grievances per
year, and these are primarily discharge cases. The parties have an expe-
dited procedure for overtime grievances, minor discipline cases, and a
few other issues, such as contracting out. The company has the right to
subcontract; however, the parties are obligated to meet and discuss
such needs before any decision is reached. Although the 1986 strike is
still discussed, it does not appear to have affected the long-term rela-
tionship of the parties. 
For many years, the USWA also benefited from the fact that labor
accounts for only about 17 percent of the cost of aluminum. The most
important cost in the production of aluminum is energy. In this sense,
then, the unions reaped the benefits of the Marshallian condition of
“the importance of being unimportant” (Kochan and Block 1977).
Within broad limits, Alcoa could be generous with the unions repre-
senting its employees, because the major cost components were associ-
ated with inputs other than labor.
Indicative of Alcoa’s labor relations strategy/philosophy is its rela-
tionship with the other local union at the Rockdale site. When Alcoa
assumed operations of the power plant and mine in the late 1980s, it
voluntarily recognized the other local union as the representative of the
mine and power plant employees. Although Alcoa unsuccessfully
requested that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) designate
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the mine and power plant as one unit, the decision did not affect the
company’s relationship with the other local. 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES
During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, Alcoa was
the dominant player in the world aluminum market. Thus, during the
period from the 1940s through the 1970s, Alcoa and its employees, like
many other unionized firms in the United States, benefited from market
dominance. Alcoa was able to pass on any cost increases that might be
associated with collective bargaining.
This favorable situation began to turn in the early 1980s. Since
then, the Rockdale plant has faced four major competitive issues. Each
of these will be discussed. 
Market Pressure
One major source of competitive pressure on Rockdale is the glo-
balization of the market for aluminum. This has manifested itself in
two ways: an increased supply of aluminum on the world market, and
the development of a centralized, market-based pricing mechanism.
Each of these will be examined.
Increased supply of aluminum
Since the early 1980s, there has been a globalization of the market
for aluminum. Developed or emerging countries (such as China, fol-
lowing an import substitution policy) have established domestic alumi-
num-smelting operations which are throwing aluminum onto the world
market. Russia for many years had an aluminum industry that serviced
the defense needs of the Soviet Union during the cold war. Now that
the cold war has ended and those defense needs no longer exist, the
aluminum produced by the Russian capacity is being sent to the world
market. In essence, the market for aluminum has become commod-
itized. Aluminum has become a commodity available from multiple
sources at a world price determined primarily by supply and demand.
Commoditization has resulted in enormous variation in the price of
aluminum. Some sense of this variation can be obtained by examining
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Figure 5.2, which depicts the cash seller and settlement price of aluminum
between July 1993 and March 1999. The price was at roughly U.S.$0.50
per pound (U.S.$1,000/ton) in late 1993. The price rose to well over
U.S.$1.00 per pound (U.S.$2,200/ton) during the first quarter of 1995.
Since then, there has been a general, albeit uneven trend downward to a
March 1999 level of U.S.$0.58 per pound (U.S.$1,150/ton). This lack of
price certainty has placed increasing cost pressure on the company,
because Alcoa’s revenue stream is less certain than it once was.
Information flows
A second major contributor toward commoditization was the emer-
gence of the London Metal Exchange (LME) in the early 1980s as a
facilitator of the market for nonferrous metals, including aluminum.
Prior to the emergence of the exchange, Alcoa, as the largest aluminum
producer in the world, could determine prices based on its cost struc-
Figure 5.2 Cash Seller and Settlement Price of Aluminum, July 1993–
March 1999
SOURCE: London Metal Exchange (www.lme.co.uk).
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ture. The LME created a market mechanism for pricing. Thus, Alcoa
now had to accept the world price of aluminum, a price that was inde-
pendent of its costs.
Cost Pressure from Environmental Regulations
The third source of competitive pressure on the Rockdale facility is
from increased environmental regulations in the 1980s, primarily the
Clean Air Act. The power plant generates and the smelter uses electric-
ity from coal, and coal creates emissions that must be cleaned. In addi-
tion, the Sandow Mine is a strip mine, and the land must be reclaimed
and restored to an appearance as close as possible to its pre-mining
state. Although some of these regulations have encouraged waste
reduction—and therefore cost reduction—in general, environmental
regulations require expenditures without a rate of return. The smelter
sees them as purely a cost. To the extent that the environmental regula-
tions impose additional costs on the production process over and above
what the company would otherwise directly incur to produce the alu-
minum, there is pressure on the collective bargaining system to be the
source of the offset of those costs. 
Cost Pressure from Use of Coal
When the decision was made in 1952 to locate the Rockdale
smelter near the coal seam, it was believed that smelter sites near rela-
tively inexpensive hydro-generated electricity would soon be
exhausted. This has not been the case. The parties estimate that coal-
generated electricity costs three times as much as water-generated elec-
tricity. As with environmental regulations, there is constant pressure on
the collective bargaining system to offset this cost disadvantage.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION
Since the mid 1980s, management and the employees at Rockdale
have become increasingly aware of the importance of plant competi-
tiveness and job protection. Plant management began to emphasize
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competitiveness in the mid 1980s, as indicated by its insistence during
the 1986 strike on increased flexibility to assign workers to tasks. The
parties have generally had a cooperative, high-trust relationship.
Therefore, when the company began to raise issues of competitiveness
with the union, and ultimately job security, the union took them seri-
ously and was willing to cooperate. The union leadership also saw con-
sistency between the company’s competitiveness/job security message
and reports in the general news media regarding globalization and
competitiveness.
Contract Changes
As one of five plants under the master Alcoa–USWA agreement,
the parties at Rockdale are somewhat constrained in their actions.
Given this, it is not surprising the parties’ main tool for addressing
competitiveness and job security has been a traditional one, wage
restraint in the collective agreement. Wage data provided by the com-
pany for a representative group of pay grades indicate that between
1977 and 1986, the average base wage increased by 62 percent, from
approximately $8.08 per hour to $13.12 per hour. From 1986 to 1996,
however, the average base wage of those classifications increased only
9 percent, from $13.12 to $14.32.
It should be noted, however, that this 9 percent increase masks
increases associated with combining of job classifications. When the
job classifications in the new grouping were upgraded, the wage rates
in the previously lower-paid classifications were increased to the level
of the higher-paid classifications in the grouping. Many employees
received wage increases associated with this upgrading. In addition,
employees have benefited from an increase in variable compensation,
such as profit sharing. A reduction in job classification and enhanced
management flexibility to assign work, provided employees are quali-
fied, was important to plant management as it gave them increased
flexibility to assign employees.
The parties also increased the length of the master contract from
the usual three years, to six years. Although there was a reopener in
2001, unresolved issues were submitted to binding arbitration. This
provided the company with increased stability in its production plan-
ning and cost structure.
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Noncontractual Formal Structures
The major structural noncontractual innovation has been the cre-
ation of partnership teams. The impetus for the teams came from cor-
porate level and the international union, who directed that all plants
covered by the Alcoa–Steelworkers master agreement undertake some
sort of initiative, primarily to upgrade the skills of the workforce. The
parties at Rockdale used this directive to create partnership teams at the
plant and department levels. The plant-level partnership team consists
of the plant manager, the labor relations staff, all department heads,
and the union bargaining committee. Each department in the smelter
also has a partnership team that sends representatives to the plant-level
team.
The union sees the purpose of the partnership team as improving
the position of the Rockdale plant in the market. At the same time, it is
advantageous to employees to have a say in how the plant is run. From
the company’s point of view, the benefit of the partnership team is the
improvement of employee productivity, leading to improving relative
market position.
The partnership team has been the vehicle through which the Alcoa
Production System, Alcoa’s version of the modern demand-driven pro-
duction system, is being implemented at Rockdale. In the ingot plant,
union and management came together to reorganize scrap handling,
saving hundreds of thousands of dollars per year by recycling scrap
that had previously not been recycled. Similar successful efforts have
been made in the pot room and the carbon plant. These efforts have
reduced costs, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the plant.
Hourly and supervisory employees have been sent to seminars and
conferences both inside and outside Alcoa to aid them in instituting the
system. They have also been sent to other Alcoa facilities for bench-
marking purposes.
The parties cited several changes that would not have occurred but
for the existence of the partnership team. These have involved the
return of work that had once been contracted out, or retention of work
that was scheduled to be contracted out. For example, the plant has a
yard service that acts like a construction crew. The yard service had
been short-staffed and unable to perform needed work. Through the
efforts of the partnership team, seven people were added to the yard
96 Block
service, and it began doing construction that had been previously con-
tracted out. This solution upgraded the skills of the workforce and per-
mitted the represented employees to do work for which Alcoa was
paying a great deal. Because of the upgrading of the workforce, the
cost differential between the contractors’ employees and the unionized
employees declined. Thus, jobs were protected through the partnership
team, encouraging the reassignment of people. 
In 1997, the plant management was considering contracting out its
janitorial function of six to eight employees. The matter came to the
attention of the partnership team. Under the auspices of the team, the
parties developed a proposal to reschedule and redistribute the janito-
rial work, including adding weekend work that could be done without
disrupting the normal production. The result was that the original jani-
torial jobs were retained and four additional janitorial jobs were cre-
ated. The retention of the janitorial jobs in the plant also had the
unintended benefit of creating some less physically demanding posi-
tions that could be filled by employees with physical restrictions.
Through the partnership team, the local union president was also
assigned 40 hours per week to union-management issues, and granted
office space in a centrally located area. This has permitted the union to
increase its awareness of all issues in the plant, as compared to the situ-
ation that would exist if the local president had assigned duties and
could respond only as contacted by employees. 
Ad Hoc Informal Structures
There are also important informal systems that are created at the
plant. For example, there is a toolbox meeting at the beginning of each
shift at which hourly employees and the supervisor discuss any issues
that have arisen, particularly safety, Alcoa’s top internal priority. As
needed, employees have been released from their jobs for specified
periods of time to develop training programs. This was done when job
classifications were combined following the 1986 negotiations, and
employees were required to be cross-trained in different crafts. In addi-
tion, as another example of informal, ad hoc action, the plant manage-
ment and local union joined together to successfully lobby their U.S.
Congressman in opposition to a tax on carbon-based fuel that could
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have threatened the existence of the plant, which depends on coal for
so much of its power.
CONCLUSIONS
Alcoa–Rockdale and Steelworkers Local 4895 have what may be
defined as a mature, traditional collective bargaining relationship. This
is based to a large extent on Alcoa’s corporate philosophy of respect
for the institution of collective bargaining and a willingness to recog-
nize the legitimacy of the unions, including the USWA, in the facilities
where the employees have chosen union representation.
There is a high level of trust between the parties, and this has facil-
itated the use of the collective bargaining relationship to enhance both
employment protection/creation and firm competitiveness. The long-
time willingness of the company to provide the union with information
on the state of the business and the facility, and the willingness of the
union to accept that information at face value, was an important first
step in adapting the relationship to the twin needs of employment pro-
tection/creation and competitiveness.
Initial responses to these two issues came not through specialized
structures designed to address employment protection/creation and
competitiveness, but rather through the traditional vehicle of the col-
lective agreement and day-to-day informal interactions. Through the
agreement the parties agreed on wage restraint, the introduction of
variable compensation, a six-year contract with an arbitrated wage
reopener, reduced job classifications, and flexibility in assignments.
Ad hoc arrangements through interactions included toolbox discus-
sions and safety committees. 
As can be seen, the parties’ mutual trust placed them in a position
where they could move away from rights-based formalism based on
management rights and union use of the grievance procedure to an
interest-based relationship. It was not necessary to create structures or
use external consultants to do this. The interest-based relationship sim-
ply flowed from the nature of the collective bargaining relationship.
When the formal competitiveness structure, the partnership team,
was mandated in 1996, the parties had no difficulty incorporating it
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into their relationship. The partnership team mandate provided a for-
mal vehicle for doing what the parties had been doing in any event. It
was easy for them to adapt to this new system.
Anecdotes suggest that there have been specific instances in which
the collective bargaining relationship contributed to job creation (such
as yard service and janitorial function). The plant continues to operate
profitably. The parties are aware of their common situation in Rock-
dale, and they will continue to do what is necessary to keep the plant
competitive in an increasingly uncertain and competitive aluminum
market.
The Alcoa Rockdale–Steelworkers Local 4895 case represents an
excellent example of how value-based employment drives collective
bargaining. With aluminum prices declining, or at least uncertain, the
revenue stream associated with the product produced by the employees
was declining, or at least less certain than it was in the past. That
declining and/or uncertain revenue stream was the chief threat to the
employees’ jobs. In the absence of legal job security guarantees in the
United States, the union must depend on itself to address job security.
At Rockdale, this took the form of cooperation with the company to
increase the cost-competitiveness of the plant by reducing the cost of
producing aluminum. Job security and firm competitiveness then were
seen as one and the same.
Notes
In addition to the interviewees cited in this chapter, the authors would like to thank Ms.
Janine Fogg, formerly with Alcoa; Mr. Greg Freehling, Alcoa; Ms. Colleen Haley,
Alcoa–Fujikura; and Mr. Jim Michaud, Alcoa–Fujikura, for their cooperation in this
research. Mr. Joe Quaglia, manager of human resources–industrial relations, and Ms.
Joyce Saltzman and Ms. Bonita Cersomino of Alcoa Corporate Communications pro-
vided important comments that enhanced the accuracy of the chapter. 
Unless otherwise noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based
on interviews with Anders et al. (1999), Carney (1999), and Cleveland et al. (1999).
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